I have converted the percentages obtained by the 3 leading parties into qualitative descriptions of what the people were saying. A candidate is "Strongly Disliked" if he gets less than 20% in a District, "Disliked" if he gets 20%-50%, "Liked" if he gets "50%-80% and "Strongly Liked" if he gets above 80%. These qualitative terms should help us determine if anyone has ry, it would be unnecessarily wasteful to have a runoff.

From the table below, APC seems to be Liked or Strongly Liked in just half of the country's 14 Districts. On the other hand they are Strongly Disliked in all but one District of the remaining half of the country. The predominant feeling about the APC is Strong Dislike. So, it is unreasonable to say they have a clear NATIONAL mandate to govern. SLPP on the other hand is Liked in 4 of the 14 Districts but, they are not as Strongly Disliked as the APC, with only 3 Districts feeling that way. The predominant feeling about the SLPP is that they are merely Disliked. PMDC is Strongly Disliked in all but 5 Districts and in fact Liked in only Bonthe District. So, of the 3 leading parties, they are furthest from claiming a national mandate to govern or act on behalf of the country.

3). Presidential vs. Parliamentary Votes

The table below examines national aggregates and percentages for Presidential, Parliamentary and invalidated votes. Important inferences are:

a). Parliamentary races were much closer than the Presidential race. In fact, SLPP and APC were separated by only 1.3 percentage points in aggregate votes for MPs. This is an apparently incongruous result, considering that APC ended with 59 (52.6%) seats to SLPP's 43 (38.4%). PMDC had 10 (8.9%), which is also well below the 15.4% of the votes their candidates received nationally. These anomalies may be partly explained by an uneven distribution of parliamentary seats relative to the number of registered voters. This must be considered during the next round of electoral re-districting.

b). Even allowing for the number of invalidated votes, Ernest Koroma seems to be more popular than his party, the APC.

c). Solomon Berewa seems to be less popular than his party, the SLPP, although this may be accounted for by the number of invalidated votes.

d). Charles Margai seems to be less popular than individual candidates of his party the PMDC, even allowing for the number of invalid votes.

e). Independent candidates received a higher number of votes than candidates from other minor parties. 

f). It is not true that the presidential runoff would have been prevented if votes were not invalidated. This is because, even if all of the invalidated votes were given to the front runner (a very unreasonable assumption), he would still have ended up with 52.2% of the votes, which is less than the 55% required to prevent a runoff. Since we really don’t know who those invalidated votes would have gone to, it is much more reasonable to assume that they would have gone to candidates in proportion to the percentage of valid votes they obtained at the District level. This is what has been done in table below, which shows that the presidential candidates suffered somewhat from invalidated votes, but not in any meaningful way across the board.

4). The Regional Dimension:

There was clearly a Regional dimension to voting patterns.

a). APC did well in the North and West, getting 76.7% and 61.3% of the votes in those respective regions. In fact, at 76.7%, the North represented the greatest stratification of voting patterns, followed by the East, which gave SLPP 65.6%.

b). PMDC did better than APC in the South-East, but at 1.6%, they hardly registered a presence in the North. In fact, PMDC's political presence seems entirely concentrated in the South, at 41.3%. This is hardly surprising, from a party set up in grievance against the SLPP, which seemed to have aggrieved people in the South most.

c). What is more surprising is the fact that protest votes against the SLPP in the West and North did not translate into significant gains by the PMDC, bringing into focus a possibly ethnic dimension to voting patterns.

d). SLPP did better in the North at 17.2% than APC did in the South-East at 13.2% 

5). Runoff by the Numbers - A Case for SLPP Optimism:

The table below presents a scenario for the Presidential runoff, in which the APC and SLPP candidates split the votes they did not get during the first round in proportion to the percentage of votes they got in each District. These simple but logical assumptions can be invalidated by reduced voter turnout for the runoff and other specific actions taken by the parties. The shaded numbers are the projected votes received by the candidates in each District and the un-shaded numbers are the number of votes gained during the runoff. In order to explain the table, I will make certain points about what an SLPP strategist might do. An APC strategist might make an equally valid case, since the final results are so close.

a). The Presidency is winnable by the SLPP, with a better than even chance.

b). The SLPP must get their voters fired up and provide all assistance to show up at the polls

c). While the SLPP may have natural allies in the votes that went elsewhere during the first round, they should not take those votes for granted, since they cannot win without them.

d). Since the votes the SLPP missed during the first round were mainly protest votes against the present leadership which needs them now, it is absolutely critical for that leadership to do everything to make amends. A good place to start is acknowledgement of what they have done wrong, followed by contrition and a simple but credible plan to make amends. Contrition starts with words "mu nyamunga, mua wu laymu ma". In Krio, it is "we don no say we mek mistek en we kam foh baig padin". Of course, such an approach should start with credible intermediaries, to reduce the fallout from losing face at the inevitable first rejection. But persistence, while opening the door a crack wider with each meeting, ending with direct meetings between the leaders, key aggrieved organizers and finally at open air rallies, can do the trick. Above all, realize that there are some problems of the human spirit that no amount of money can buy and only skillful, genuine/honest human relations can resolve. 

e). Educate/remind people through public media, word-of mouth etc. of all the bad things the opposition represents from their past and show a link between their past and present. 

 Have the SLPP leadership understand that failure is not an option because they will personally suffer far more if they lose, than any supporter. In the first place, the opposition dislikes them passionately and there will be commissions of inquiry which will find them guilty of a whole host of things (in the US, they say a grand jury can indict a ham sandwich if the DA wants them to). Secondly, losing will inevitably mean the end of their political career as a lot of SLPP members will hold them personally responsible for the loss. Finally, their legacy will always be talked of in terms of failure, deservedly or not.