It is hard to believe today, in just about two years following the 2007 elections; Sierra Leone seemed on the brink of a failed state. During the rainy season of 2007, Sierra Leoneans went to the polls; and for the first time since the demise of Albert Margai’s Sierra Leone People’s Party (S.L.P.P.) regime in 1967, Sierra Leoneans again witnessed the defeat of the incumbent party after the All People’s Congress (A.P.C.) took over 55% of the presidential votes, and also winning a majority in Parliament. In Freetown, activists from across the political spectrum of the A.P.C. machine and the people’s Movement for Democratic Change (P.M.D.C.), having grown more confident and savvy, forced the government of Vice President Solomon Berewa out of power. The outcome of the 2007 elections seemed to have triumphantly suggested that Sierra Leone had finally arrived at that mythic tipping point.

Within the international community, however, there was detectable unease, particularly when it came to the developments in Sierra Leone. The international community officials were worrying about how to react, not because they questioned President Ernest Koroma’s "leadership" but because political transformation in Sierra Leone presented a policy puzzle with no simple solution. On the one hand, Berewa and his associates were profoundly unpopular; on the other, the opposition (A.P.C.) was thin on policy experts and reformers and heavy on political dilettantes and youthful party thugs, all deeply not favored by the international community.

More broadly, the party system in Sierra Leone was divided along fault lines that had vexed Sierra Leonean politics for decades. It was, however, not difficult to believe that the A.P.C. and the P.M.D.C., acting in alliance, were able to dislodge the S.L.P.P. The victorious S.L.P.P. in 1996 had abandoned their plans to reform Sierra Leone’s political system. And with Sierra Leoneans clearly disappointed by ten years of S.L.P.P. rule—the competition became evident that even though as the incumbent party clearly lost to the A.P.C.—a remarkable come back for a party whose image was badly damaged following the N.P.R.C. coup. The third-party P.M.D.C., as the case was, collaborated with the A.P.C. to seal the fate of the S.L.P.P. Although the stakes of a change in leadership in Sierra Leone were considerably lower for the international community than for Sierra Leoneans, the outcome has created a vibrant democracy at home and online (the World Wide Web). A recent addition to the conversation is the New People Newspaper’s investigative journalism.

Readers looking for the inside story on what is happening in Sierra Leone under the A.P.C. are not disappointed at all; there is a great deal of gossip in these pages about A.P.C. incompetence. Readers are generally rewarded by the New People newspaper’s ambitious effort to explain how significant political actors, specifically, in President Koroma’s administrative machine, the judiciary, and the business sector, are doing badly to influence the country's trajectory over time.

Sluggish Progress, Real Fragility

President Koroma has to choose whether to undertake difficult reforms in the interest of stability and prosperity for Sierra Leone or politics as usual. So far the Sierra Leonean people are not impressed with him because performance has been disappointing, and complacency appears to have set in. While there is plenty of reform rhetoric and open government initiative proclamations, action is yet to follow. The administration’s lack of political will to tackle the corrupt gangs of public officials, and to purge the police force of irresponsible officers is making the country a dangerous place again in the world. What is happening in the country is not helping to restore the confidence of the Sierra Leonean population and the international community. There was euphoria in Sierra Leone in 2007 but in about two years many Sierra Leoneans are saying the ruling administration has already failed so far to offer a clear direction, and there are consistent signs that donor dependence and the old political ways are returning.

Many are questioning the government’s commitment and capacity to address the long list of internal challenges, ranging from security concerns and economic recovery through implementation of a broad spectrum of institutional reforms. Even though people say he has waffled, compromised, and support less definitive measures, he still has the privilege to change course and take stronger measures. Today, Sierra Leone is being troubled by a great economic and human development war with gory details about how bad it is in the country. Millions are out of work. Images of poverty are visible everywhere.

Even with Koroma’s recent Cabinet reshuffle, people are saying his new Cabinet still does not show the promise of better performing public offices to come either. He retained and made some indispensable choices for these positions. Much more disconcerting with respect to those appointments, is just what records of nothingness those appointed bring to the table. In any case, what is really needed in Cabinet and government agency jobs right now are heavyweights to sell some big ideas. Just watching Attorney General Serry-Kamal at the Ministry of Justice in action, one can’t help but think that he is the sheer antithesis of gravitas. Nonetheless, one can interject here that, Koroma is not a dummy. He can see what's happening. He feels a lot of pressure to produce and so, his strategy must evolve. It has to. The deteriorating situation in the country begs for that, to go further, to go deeper, and to try to leverage his power to be more effective. That is, if he can also get his party’s youth wing to avoid the temptations to get more bellicose with the S.L.P.P. youth into the "big muddy" of party rivalry.

Sierra Leone needs a President who is willing to re-examine policies that are not working and dare to be great. And as the saying goes, “without struggle there can be no progress." With so many interests and Diaspora entities now leaning on Koroma, the country needs his supporters to press him to do the right things to satisfy public opinion, and ease public pain, or else!

Unhealthy Rivalry

Today, a perennial target of the A.P.C. political capital, sometimes literally, has been the S.L.P.P., the political group established in April 1951 through the merger of the Peoples Party (P.P.), the Protectorate Education Progressive Union (P.E.P.U.) and the Sierra Leone Organization Society (S.O.S.). It is the grand old party (G.O.P.) which hoped to foster among the Sierra Leonean masses so much demand for a national party that promoted the relevance of the country people in national politics as such “was able to position itself as ‘the countryman’s party’, and notably garnered support of the tribal chiefs”.

The last time the S.L.P.P. contested elections was in 1967, and the A.P.C. actually won those elections, and its leader was sworn in as Prime minister, only to be instantly ousted by a military putsch orchestrated by Albert Margai. A.P.C. leader Siaka Stevens was eventually sworn in as Prime Minister on April 1968 after series of coups. Power was quickly consolidated and one party state established in 1978. Stevens handed over power August 1985 to hand-picked successor General Joseph Momoh. When the N.P.R.C. officers launched their revolution in April 1992 and literally overthrew Joseph Momoh’s government, it found allies in the S.L.P.P. which had been in political purgatory since 1967. These young revolutionaries shared an abiding opposition to the A.P.C. arrogance and monopoly of State power.

And in the almost 11 years since the N.P.R.C. officers’ guided the S.L.P.P. come back, much has been written about the S.L.P.P. and its relationship to the Sierra Leonean political system. The junta operators had overseen the first democratic elections in almost two decades and the victorious S.L.P.P. formed a government with Tejan Kabbah as leader. For ten years Kabbah led a very corrupt government for which the party was severely punished by losing the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections. It would seem that Koroma’s A.P.C. would recognize the level at which Sierra Leone’s democracy has transformed itself and would take advantage of the second chance given to it to score above average in raising the nation from its depths of decadence. But almost two years in office, President Koroma, in his quiet and self-effacing way, has not proven much that he means business. And today, set aside any Koroma euphoria following his 2007 victory, the country remains in a very bad state and President Koroma has not made tough choices to confront corruption in government.

Even worse, the recent political violence, including the spate of armed robberies in the country, portrays underlying problems with law and order which have negative ramifications for this developing nation. This is not good for the country and if the unhealthy rivalry between the A.P.C. and the S.L.P.P. decays into tribal or regional name calling it will be so disastrous for the nation. The A.P.C. has not learned any lessons on how to show restraint. Some observers are saying that the S.L.P.P. wants Koroma to fail. It's been suggested that the S.L.P.P.’s solidarity front was not so much about Koroma’s plan of action to stem the tide of corrupt behaviors in Sierra Leone as sending a message to the Koromacrats not to pursue any prosecutions connected to the Kabbah era. But even if Koroma himself, who keeps stressing his desire to look forward not backwards, doesn't have the gumption to go after his predecessors, he may have to consider taking bolder steps on effectively managing what resources are left of Sierra Leone to stave off the human development Armageddon many fear.

Third-Party Alternative

The majority of Sierra Leoneans may be blaming themselves at this time regretting having voted for the A.P.C. because a third-party alternative for Sierra Leone could have been a better choice. Both these major parties (the grand old S.L.P.P. and the A.P.C.) have record failures in governing Sierra Leone. But the problem is that third-party presidential and parliamentary candidates have always had miserable showings in presidential and parliamentary elections.

It couldn't be clearer that Sierra Leoneans are not willing to voice their political discontent by voting for third-party presidential and parliamentary candidates. The A.P.C. - S.L.P.P. two-party duopoly and plutocracy is completely dominant. A key problem is that for many years, third parties have not offered presidential candidates that capture the attention and commitment of Sierra Leoneans. Dr. Karefa Smart came close in the February 1996 elections. But Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s Sierra Leone People's Party (S.L.P.P.) made a strong showing with 608,419 of the votes or 59.49 percent; with Karefa Smart’s U.N.P.P. taking 414,335 of the votes or 40.49 percent. The A.P.C. party had just been whacked out of power by the N.P.R.C. (with the conniving influence of S.L.P.P. operators) so the party was still trying to regroup as such the S.L.P.P. took advantage of its arch rival, the A.P.C. (with its leader Edward Turay coming very short with a measly 38,316 votes or 5.2 percent.

Among the four most significant third-parties presidential candidates in the first round of the 1996 presidential elections, Dr. John Karefa-Smart of the United National People's Party (U.N.P.P.) did his best in these elections with 168,666 votes or 22.7 percent. He was followed by Thaimu Bangura of the People's Democratic Party (P.D.P.) with 119,782 votes or 16.1 percent, followed by Dr. John Karimu of the National Unity Party (N.U.P.) with 39,617 votes or 5.3 percent; and Abu Aiah Koroma of the Democratic Center Party (D.C.P.) with 36,779 votes or 5.0 percent).

In 2007 general elections, the A.P.C. party has taken back its position in the country’s duopoly—with Ernest Koroma taking 815,523 of the votes or 44.3 percent. The incumbent party, the S.L.P.P., fell short with only 704,012 of the votes or 38.3 percent. Among the four most significant third-party presidential candidates for these elections, Charles Margai with his brand new party did his best with 255,499 of the votes or 13.9 percent. The other candidates were so insignificant Andrew Turay of the Convention Peoples Party (C.P.P.) took only 28,610 of the votes or 1.6 percent; Alhaji Amadu Jalloh of the National Democratic Alliance (N.D.A.) with 17,748 of the votes or 1.0 percent; Kandeh Baba Conteh of the Peace and Liberation Party (P.L.P.) with 10,556 of the votes or 0.6 percent; and Abdul Kady Karim of the United National People’s party (U.N.P.P.) with 7,260 votes or 0.4 percent

In round numbers, Ernest Koroma’s A.P.C. raised about Le4.2 billion and Solomon Berewa’s S.L.P.P. raised Le5.9 trillion, compared to Charles Margai with Le154 million, Alhaji Amadu Jalloh of the N.D.A. with about Le119 million, and Andrew Turay of the C.P.P. with about Le102 million. The other third-party candidates, Kandeh Baba Conteh’s P.L.P. only raised Le27 million; and Abdul Kady Karim of the U.N.P.P. raised over Le202 million but suffered a very poor showing